This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The government is assumed to act in accordance with a utilitarian objective function. The main purpose of the paper is to study the determinants of tax progression and, in particular, to relate tax progression to the choice of work hours. We show how the optimal degree of tax progression depends on the incentives underlying the choice of work hours, as well as on whether or not the government can monitor the wage rate via tax policy. If the wage rate is chosen by the union member with median seniority, in which case the wage rate will be fixed under certain conditions, the marginal tax rate is unambiguously positive and the tax structure unambiguously progressive. If, on the other hand, the union acts according to the utilitarian framework, we can no longer in general rule out regressive tax systems. We also show that the tax system is more likely to be progressive if the individual union members freely choose their hours of work conditional on the wage rate, than if the union is able to directly affect the hours of work per employee.
Introduction
The effects of labor tax progression in terms of wage rates and employment depend on the underlying structure of the labor market. If the labor market is competitive, the traditional view is that a progressive income tax system discourages employment via the labor supply decision.
1 If, on the other hand, the labor market is dominated by trade unions and the hours of work per employee are fixed, several studies have found that an increase in the progression of the tax system tends to reduce the wage rate and increase employment. 2 This is so because higher tax progression makes increases in the wage rate more costly in terms of lost employment from the point of view of the unions.
Previous studies on optimal taxation in unionized economies have mainly been concerned with flat tax rates 3 , whereas the question of efficient nonlinear taxation has received little attention. One exception is Fuest and Huber (1997) , who solve the optimal tax problem of a utilitarian government 4 by using a model where the labor supply per employee is fixed. Their results suggest that the optimal tax system may be either progressive or regressive. In general, the optimal degree of tax progression -measured as the marginal tax rate over the average tax rate -depends on a variety of factors such as the wage elasticity of the labor demand, the distribution of bargaining power and the existence of unemployment benefits. Similarly, Aronsson and Sjögren (2001) consider optimal taxation and provision of public goods in the context of a mixed tax problem, where the hours of work are endogenous, and the set of tax instruments consists of a nonlinear income tax and linear commodity taxes. Their main contribution is to derive policy rules for the tax instruments and the public good under union wage setting. They do not explicitly relate the degree of tax progression to imperfect competition in the labor market.
The purpose of this paper is to study the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax in a unionized economy. We assume that the government faces a utilitarian objective.
1 See e.g. Sandmo (1983) . 2 See Layard (1982) , Hersoug (1984) , Malcolmson and Sartor (1987) , Hoel (1989) , Lockwood and Manning (1993) , Holmlund and Kolm (1995) and Aronsson et al (1997) . 3 See, for example Palokangas (1987) , Boeters and Schneider (1999) and Koskela and Schöb (2000) . 4 More specifically, they assume that the objective of the government is a generalization of the utilitarian objective function.
However, contrary to the study by Fuest and Huber (1997) , the hours of work per employee are assumed to be endogenous. The analysis is based on a general equilibrium model, where the number of employed persons and the hours of work per employee are perfect substitutes in the production function. We also distinguish between two different descriptions of the labor market; one in which the union acts in accordance with the seniority model of Oswald (1993) , and the other where the union has a traditional utilitarian (or expected utility) objective. In the seniority model, the number of employed persons do not enter the objective function of the union, and the government will not be able to monitor the wage rate via the labor income tax under certain conditions. On the other hand, if a utilitarian union characterizes the labor market, the wage rate will be a function of the policy instruments. This distinction is interesting in the sense that the optimal tax policy depends on the channels through which taxation influences the employment.
To be able to focus on the relationship between tax progression and the labor market in a unionized economy, we will not consider asymmetric information or other motives for tax progression that also apply under perfect competition. Instead, the motives for tax progression discussed here are due to imperfect competition in the labor market. The paper contributes to the literature in primarily three ways. The first is by relating the optimal degree of tax progression to the choice of work hours. As far as we know, this aspect of tax progression has not been analyzed in previous studies on optimal taxation in unionized economies. If employed individuals choose their hours of work conditional on the wage rate, then work hours will be determined by individual preferences and constraints. In an economy with unemployment, this means that the employed individuals do not consider the tradeoff between the number of employed persons and the hours of work per employee. As such, there is an external effect associated with the choice of hours of work, which provides an incentive for the government to use a progressive tax system to increase employment by lowering the hours of work per employee.
The second contribution is to relate the optimal degree of tax progression to union objectives and, in particular, to whether or not tax policy influences the wage rate. We show that if the union member with median seniority is decisive, the marginal income tax rate facing the employed union members should be unambiguously positive and the tax structure unambiguously progressive. If, on the other hand, the union acts according to the utilitarian framework, we can no longer in general rule out regressive tax systems. The third contribution, finally, is by showing that the argument for progressive labor income taxation becomes weaker if the union is able to directly affect the hours of work. The reason is that if the union chooses the hours of work for its members, it will recognize that an increase in the hours of work tends to reduce employment.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we set up the basic model. Section 3 concerns optimal taxation in case a median voter model for the union determines the wage rate.
In section 4, we analyze the optimal tax structure under the assumption that the union faces a utilitarian objective. Section 5 summarizes the results.
The Model
Consider an economy where a single good is produced by competitive firms. The firms are identical and their number normalized to unity. Let N be the number of employed persons and L total employment, where the latter is defined as the number of employed persons times the hours of work per employee, l. Labor is the only input in the production process, and the production function is given by ( )
. The objective of the representative firm is to maximize profits, π , and the objective function is written
where w is the wage rate. The firm chooses labor input according to the first order condition To simplify the analysis, we follow Fuest and Huber (1997) by assuming that all profits accrue to the firm-owners, the number of which is normalized to unity. The firm-owner does not work and profits are untaxed, so his/her utility is given by ( ) 
By substituting the budget constraint into the objective function, the first order condition for the hours of work is written ( )
which is standard and needs no further interpretation.
Optimal taxation in the Seniority Union Model
We assume that all workers are union members. Let us begin by characterizing the wage formation process in terms of the median voter model developed by Oswald (1993) , in which the members are ranked according to seniority. The behavior of the union is decided upon by majority voting, meaning that the median union member, who is the person with median seniority, is decisive. The median voter's seniority position will reflect employment levels greater than or equal to 2 / M . Since employment is assumed to be preferable to unemployment, the aim of the median union member is to achieve the highest possible utility, conditional on being employed.
Suppose that the profits are driven down to some minimum level, π , because of entry or the threat of entry. The optimization problem facing the union can be written as
Note that this formulation implies that either the wage rate or the employment is fixed. Our purpose of using the median voter model is to explore the relationship between work hours and tax progression in case the wage rate is fixed from the point of view of the government.
Let us, therefore, follow Oswald by assuming that the first constraint is binding 5 . This means the wage will be fixed at the level implicitly defined by ( ) π
, the union is locally indifferent to the level of employment. The equilibrium employment is assumed to satisfy M N < .
The Optimal Tax Problem
We assume a utilitarian social welfare function
The set of policy instruments consists of the unemployment income, b, and the parameters of the tax function. Note that, by choosing the parameters of ( ) c , l and b are chosen in an optimal way from society's point of view, they can be used to construct a tax and expenditure system such that, if implemented in the decentralized economy, the private sector will choose the socially optimal resource allocation.
The government maximizes equation (5) subject to equation (3) as well as subject to two additional constraints. The first is a budget constraint, where the tax revenues are used to finance the unemployment benefit. By using the private budget constraint,
, the government's budget constraint can be written as ( ) ( )
The second constraint is a work incentive (WI) constraint, which assures that the state of employment is weakly preferred to the state of unemployment. The WI constraint is given by
The Lagrangean corresponding to the social optimization problem is written
The first order conditions become
where the subindices denote partial derivatives. Equation (8a) characterizes the socially optimal choice of unemployment income. We can interpret ( ) The intuition is straightforward. To internalize the external effect from the choice of work hours, the government uses a progressive tax on labor income in order to reduce the hours of work per employee. This effect is captured by the third term on the right hand side. The greater the utility loss of being unemployed, i.e. the greater u e u u − , the more progressive the income tax. Note that the unemployment benefit also works to increase the marginal tax rate over the average tax rate. The reason is that the higher the unemployment income, the greater the budgetary cost of unemployment to the government, and the greater the need to increase employment by decreasing the hours of work per employee.
Note also that the WI constraint tends to offset the part of the marginal tax rate that serves to correct for the external effect. If the WI constraint is binding, the final term on the right hand side of equation (9) disappears. This means that the WI constraint tends to reduce the marginal tax rate and the degree of tax progression. The intuition is that, if the WI constraint is binding, there is an incentive to make the state of employment more attractive relative to the state of unemployment. The latter is achieved by reducing the marginal tax rate, which increases the utility of the employed.
The Utilitarian Union Model
An implication of the variant of the seniority model discussed above is that the wage rate is fixed from the point of view of the government. This means that the only possibility for the government to increase the number of employed persons is to decrease the hours of work per employee. In this section, we relax the assumption that the union member with median seniority is decisive and, instead, assume that the union acts in accordance with a utilitarian objective function. As is standard, we will not impose any minimum restriction on profits in what follows, meaning that neither the wage rate nor the employment will be fixed. The objective function facing the union is given by
The union chooses the wage rate conditional on l and b to maximize equation (10) subject to
. By assuming an interior solution for employment, M N < , the first order condition can be written as 6 ( ) ( )
m u e w w (11) 6 The monopoly union model used here is a special case of the more general right-to-manage model, where the union and the firm bargain over the wage rate, and the firm then chooses employment conditional on the wage rate. As long as the wage rate exceeds the market clearing wage rate, the qualitative results to be derived below are not particularly sensitive to whether the wage rate is chosen by a monopoly union or the outcome of a more general bargaining model. In fact, if a right-to-manage framework replaces the monopoly union assumption, the wage rate will be a function of the policy instruments in a way similar to equation (12) below. This made us choose the monopoly union model over the more computationally burdensome right-to-manage model. See Oswald (1985) for a review of models commonly used to describe unionized labor markets. Another possible extension of the model set out above is to assume that the union behaves as a Stackelberg leader in the sense of recognizing that its choice of wage rate will influence the hours of work. We will not consider this possibility here. Instead, to analyze the consequences of assuming that the union is able to influence the choice of work hours, in the final part of this section we consider the situation where the union both chooses the wage rate and the hours of work per employee.
We assume that the second order condition, 0 < ww U , is satisfied. It is straightforward to show that the wage rate chosen by the union increases with b and a t , and decreases with m t .
The optimal Tax Problem
To begin with, let us assume that those who become employed can freely choose their hours of work conditional on the wage rate. In this case, equations (3) and (11) constitute the necessary conditions of the private sector by determining the hours of work per employee and the wage rate, respectively. It will be convenient to rewrite equation (11) by eliminating the
. By using equation (3), we can rewrite equation (11) as The Lagrangean of the optimal tax problem is written
Note that, since the social welfare function equals the Lagrangean at the optimum, and by defining L w L w / = ε to be the wage elasticity of the labor demand, we have
Equations (13a), (13b) and (13c) differ from their counterparts in section 3, because the wage rate here depends on the decision variables of the government. The final term on the right hand side of each necessary condition reflects the influence of that policy instrument on the wage rate times the welfare effect of an increase in the wage rate. Note from equation (13d) that the latter is ambiguous; the first two terms on the right hand side are negative, whereas the third term can be either positive or negative depending on how the tax revenues and expenditures respond to an increase in the wage rate.
By analogy to the analysis carried out in the previous section, we can derive the following result; The first three terms on the right hand side of equation (14) are equivalent to their counterparts in equation (9). Therefore, the second and third terms on the right hand side contribute to increase the marginal tax rate over the average tax rate. The fourth term, on the other hand, can be either positive or negative. This additional part of the implicit expression for the marginal tax rate is explained by the fact that the government is now able to affect employment both via the hours of work per employee (as before) and via the influence of each policy instrument on the wage rate. The interpretation is that, in comparison with the situation where the policy instruments have no influence on the wage rate, the government now has a more comprehensive set of mechanisms to use in order to affect the employment.
The government is, therefore, no longer necessarily restricted to use a progressive tax.
By analogy to equation (9), the purpose of the third term on the right hand side of equation (14) is to internalize the external effect associated with the hours of work. However, although there is an external effect, due to the tradeoff between the number of employed persons and the hours of work per employee, a small decrease in the hours of work per employee does not necessarily contribute to increase employment, if the union behaves according to the utilitarian framework. This is so because l w ∂ ∂ / can in general be either positive or negative.
If the union responds to an increase in the hours of work per employee by lowering the wage rate, there is a tendency for employment to increase which may, in turn, offset the direct negative effect on employment following from an increase in the hours of work per employee.
Note also that a negative relationship between the wage rate and the hours of work per employee is not a necessary condition for the tax structure to be regressive. The reason is that 
Taken together, equations (15) and (11) now determine the hours of work and the wage rate, respectively, conditional on the policy variables. Note that, for a given wage rate, equation (15) implies that the union chooses fewer hours of work than would be chosen by the individual himself/herself, since the union recognizes that an increase in the hours of work reduces the number of employed persons.
Consider Proposition 3; 
The difference between equations (14) and (16) is that the third term on the right hand side of equation (14) is not part of equation (16). This is so because, if the union chooses the hours of work per employee, the external effect associated with the choice of work hours will be internalized. The following result is an immediate consequence of Propositions 2 and 3; 
Summary and Discussion
The purpose of this paper is to study the optimal degree of tax progression in a unionized economy. The analysis is based on a general equilibrium model, where the hours of work are endogenous, and that the government faces a utilitarian objective. Two versions of the labor market part of the model are being discussed; one in which the union member with median seniority is decisive, and the other where the union acts in accordance with a utilitarian objective function. This comparison is interesting, since a variant of the former model means that the wage rate is fixed from the point of view of the government. We also distinguish between the situation where the employed individuals choose the hours of work conditional on the wage rate, and the situation where the union chooses the hours of work. The latter distinction is relevant for optimal taxation. If the employed were able to choose the hours of work themselves, then individual preferences determine the hours of work, whereas a union with preferences for employment also recognizes a tradeoff between the number of employed persons and hours of work per employee. As such, the assumptions underlying how the hours of work are chosen will be important for the tax structure.
Since employed individuals do not consider the tradeoff between the number of employed persons and the hours of work per employee, there will be an incentive to use a progressive tax system for the purpose of reducing the hours of work. We show that if the union member with median seniority is decisive, in which case the wage rate is fixed from the point of view of the government, the marginal income tax rate facing the employed union members should be unambiguously positive and the tax structure unambiguously progressive. If, on the other hand, the union acts according to the utilitarian framework, we can no longer in general rule out regressive tax systems. In this case, the wage rate will be a function of the policy instruments, meaning that the government has a broader set of mechanisms via which to influence the resource allocation. Therefore, if the wage rate depends on the tax system, it may no longer be necessary to use a progressive income tax in order to influence employment in the way the government desires. We also show that the argument for progressive labor income taxation becomes weaker, if the union is able to directly affect the hours of work. 
